Hear a great Human rights violations video while reading! What are some Chinese Christian human rights violations? Biden administration wants to crush dissent like this, right?
😂 China has reneged on the Phase One trade agreement, now what? China missed targets for buying U.S. goods, but retaliating could come at a cost to American companies and consumers.😂 As retaliation, Biden recently added eight Chinese technology firms to the Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies (NS-CMIC) list.
😂 On December 28, 2021, OFAC further amended the NS-CMIC list to add an additional Chinese firm. Placement on this list prohibits US persons (including US citizens, US companies, permanent residents, and individuals and entities located within the US) from engaging in the purchase or the sale of publicly traded securities with designated entities,
😂 or any publicly traded securities that are derivative of such securities or are designed to provide investment exposure to such securities. The US Department of Commerce also added 40 Chinese entities to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) Entity List. Keep in mind that in November 2020, former President Trump signed Executive Order No. 13959 “Addressing the Threat from Securities Investments that Finance Communist Chinese Military Companies,” prohibiting security transactions between US persons and Communist Chinese Military Companies.
😂 Finally, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) is an economic initiative launched by United States President Joe Biden on May 23, 2022, among Australia, Brunei, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. IPEF is most definitely intended to check China’s economic dominance in Southeast Asia, but the Biden administration is taking great pains not to say so, because the dozen initial partners in IPEF are also members of RCEP, and the last thing they want is to get caught in any rhetorical crossfire between the U.S. and China. The IPEF’s main goal is to exclude China from supply chains in cutting-edge and future-oriented industries and to reorganize those supply chains around the US. The US has made clear that it intends to counter China’s unfair trade practices and market distortions.
😂 Not waiting for Biden to present a plan, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) signed Nov. 20, 2020 a free trade agreement that was made among the Asia-Pacific nations of Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
😂 Civil society groups have raised other objections other than this new pact turning into an anti-China alliance.: The IPEF will lock in trademark protections for overpriced medicines, protect tax exemptions for big digital platforms, speed privatization. So is this lousy agreement worth it, even if IPEF serves as a bridge to a formal trade agreement a few years from now?
😂 Unlike TPP or CPTTP, IPEF is not a traditional free trade agreement (FTA). Nevertheless, the success of IPEF will depend on factors similar to those involved in an FTA – offering tangible benefits to partners and securing binding commitments for strong policies and standards from partners. Added membership requirements is uncertain at this time.
😂 There is much that China could do to substitute for Russia’s potential loss of energy sales in Europe. The International Energy Agency (IEA) reports that Russia produces some 10.5 million barrels of oil a day but consumes only some 3.5 million of those barrels. Accordingly, it needs to export some 7 million barrels of oil a day. Similar relative proportions apply to natural gas. Since China imports some 11 million barrels of oil a day, and considerable natural gas as well, it could theoretically absorb any amount that Russia fails to sell under the new sanctions regime.
😂 But it is not that simple. To buy all that Russia needs to sell, China would have to increase its purchases of Russian energy three-fold. Instead of the 15.5% of energy imports China presently gets from Russia, the proportion would have to rise to almost 55%. Not only would that impose on China’s already strained supply chains, at least for a while, but Beijing might be reluctant to alienate existing supply relationships. On top of this are considerations of China’s position in the world. The U.S. State Department has warned China not to help Russia avoid sanctions. That might give pause, but so also does the fact that half the world’s economies, most of the buyers of China’s exports, have joined the sanctions regime, and Beijing has no desire to get on the wrong side of such an important, and dominant, group.
😂 However, as this relationship develops, it would seem to be more beneficial to China than to Russia. Provided that China can avoid alienating existing energy and raw material suppliers and its other trade partners generally, its economy, after a period of adjustment, would give up nothing to enlarge the relationship. What is no doubt more appealing to Beijing is that Russia, to build the necessary infrastructure would become even more deeply obligated to Chinese finance, as is true of most nations that have opened themselves to China’s BRI. In time, the relationship could progress to a point where a deeply indebted and dependent Russia would effectively become part of a Chinese sphere of influence – a bitter irony for Putin.
😂 Top Chinese banks are rushing to ensure they can maintain business ties with Russian clients without running afoul of a barrage of Western sanctions. Western nations are tightening an economic noose around Russia following its invasion of Ukraine, shutting its banks from the SWIFT global financial network and pushing global firms to dump billions in investment.
😂 While the Chinese banking regulator said this week the country would not join the West's sanctions on Russia, some of its banks have stopped issuing dollar-denominated letters of credit for purchases of physical commodities.
😂 And now, executives at some leading Chinese banks are exploring alternative payment systems as well as the possibility of passing some of their business to small domestically focused peers to avoid getting caught in secondary sanctions.
😂 Secondary sanctions are restrictions that apply to entities that conduct U.S. dollar business with the underlying sanctioned entity. An entity seen to be violating such sanctions faces the risk of being cut off from sources of U.S. dollar liquidity.
😂 The internal perception is that if the sanctions get worse regarding SWIFT, we can find ways around it. A potential "workaround" is for smaller local Chinese banks to work on transactions that larger peers with overseas business interest have to steer clear of.
😂 It’s been seen that banks stopped issuing dollar-denominated credit letters for purchases of Russian commodities, but not seen any impact on yuan-denominated transactions between China and Russia yet.
😂 Big Chinese banks that have business and branches overseas might become very cautious, as Washington and its allies can sanction operations in the Western markets in the event of violations.
😂 Smaller (Chinese) banks that don't have much presence overseas might dare do so as you cannot come to China to sanction them. All bank sources Reuters spoke to for this story declined to be named as they were not authorised to speak to the media.
😂 China is Russia's biggest trade partner, buying a third of Russia's crude oil exports in 2020 and supplying it with manufactured products from cell phones and computers to toys and clothing.
😂 However, analysts say the exposure of China's big four state-owned banks to Russia is limited. Among them, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd (601398.SS) is one of the biggest Chinese banks in Russia and the first to provide yuan clearing services there. But even its local business accounted for less than 1% of its total assets as of end-June 2021, according to its semi-annual report.
😂 Amid the sanctions, some Russian firms are scrambling to open accounts with Chinese banks as they look to make greater use of the yuan for trade.
😂 So far, China does not appear to be helping Russia evade Western financial sanctions on Moscow, but doing so would "do profound damage". Investment bank Natixis said Western economies are less likely to continue to "engage wholeheartedly" in China's financial sector if Russia looks at it as a solution to its sanctions. Some branches of overseas Chinese lenders took immediate action to adhere to sanctions -- Bank of China's Singapore operation has stopped financing deals involving Russian oil and companies.
😂 At others, where sanctions have a less direct impact, internal meetings are being held on the new risks and finding an alternative to SWIFT, though some bankers admit there is currently no feasible replacement. While there was work in progress to develop an alternative messaging system to SWIFT, it was not yet fully operational.
😂 On the issue of whether Russia could effectively use China's own Cross-Border Interbank Payment System to bypass sanctions; the Chinese system was illiquid and the number of foreign institutions linked to it remained limited.
😂 Central bank digital currencies (CBDC) are digital tokens issued by central banks. In a way, they are the digital version of cash; their value is guaranteed by a central bank. Unlike money held in credit cards and mobile wallets, CBDCs are not a mere representation of physical money stored elsewhere. Instead, they are a complete replacement for currency notes. While several countries are developing their digital currencies, China is well positioned to take the lead with the digital yuan. Just imagine ways in which China can use its digital yuan to internationalize the renminbi (RMB) and gradually chip away at the hegemony of the dollar. Chinese money comes by two names: the Yuan (CNY) and the people's renminbi (RMB). The distinction is subtle: while renminbi is the official currency of China where it acts as a medium of exchange, the yuan is the unit of account of the country's economic and financial system.
😂 Let's focus on the dollar’s dominance in the global financial system and the privileges the United States accrues as a result of the dollar being the world reserve currency. The United States has a tight grip on the world’s payment rails, especially in the case of cross-border transactions. For example, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT)—the largest cross-border payment clearinghouse in the world—has to comply with and implement unilateral U.S. sanctions. These sanctions seriously hinder trade and damage the economies of the countries affected by them, as was the case with Iran, which lost $150 billion worth of revenue as a result of U.S. sanctions. Once a country is cut off from SWIFT’s network, it becomes extremely difficult for it to trade with the rest of the world. Thus, via the dollar’s dominance and its geopolitical muscle, the United States is positioned to maintain a tight grip on the world’s financial system.
😂 In an increasingly multipolar world, this outdated, decades-old system of the dollar as the apex currency and the United States’ position of power that allows it to pursue its own geopolitical interests has become outdated. The U.S. dollar’s hegemony has been challenged by economies like those of the European Union (EU), Russia, and China. Of all the countries, China finds itself in a dominant position to gain from this transition. In order to challenge the dollar’s hegemony and internationalize its currency, China will have to move away not just from the dollar but also from the payment rails dominated by the dollar. The best way to simultaneously do both would be to introduce a new payment rail like CBDCs.
😂 Imagine the way the launch of China’s CBDC could bring a period of momentous change in the global financial system. In order to challenge the dollar, China will have to build the payments infrastructure required to facilitate the use of its digital yuan. It will also have to incentivize other countries to adopt its digital currency. China’s ability to successfully promote its currency using CBDCs will depend heavily on the country’s ability to relax capital controls and maintain the world’s trust in its institutions. China’s geopolitics will play a key role here. In the last decade, some of China’s major geopolitical efforts have set the stage for its CBDC launch.
😂 As China continues to use its foreign policy and technological capabilities to grow its influence in the global financial system, the launch of the digital yuan could be a significant step forward in this direction. Now examine the reasons for China’s past efforts at currency dominance and think of ways in which the country can use its CBDC to further internationalize its digital yuan.
